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The Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation ("Foundation") respectfully submits this
Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant in accordance with the Court's Order dated June 5,
2012.

I. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Idaho Trial Lawyers Association ("ITLA") formed the Foundation to provide
independent and scholarly assistance to Idaho's courts through amicus briefing on issues of public
interest. The Foundation seeks to participate in cases involving novel issues of law which further
access to the justice system, preserve the constitutional right to trial by jury, and generally promote
the common good. The Foundation filed a Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae in this
case because it involves a novel issue of law which is of substantial interest to ITLA members and
the trial bar. The Foundation is concerned that the position adopted by the Industrial Commission
is inconsistent with the plain language of I. C. § 72-223(3) and may impede access to the justice
system and enable people who are responsible for injuries to escape liability. For these reasons, the
Foundation urges the Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's decision and remand this case
with instructions to allocate Mr. Izaguirre's settlement proceeds among the various categories of
damages supported by the evidence and recalculate the credit the surety is to receive against future
compensation benefits.

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT- 1

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.
When reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, this Court exercises free review over

questions of law. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). The
construction of a statute is a question oflaw. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 90506, 980 P.2d 566, 569-70 (1999). Because this case involves the construction and application of
I. C. § 72-223(3), this Court should freely review the Industrial Commission's decision.

B.

Subection 72-223(3) Limits a Surety's Right to Subrogation from Amounts Allocated
for Losses Covered by Workers Compensation.
The Industrial Commission ruled that the entire settlement received by Mr. Izaguirre is

subject to Zurich American Insurance Co.'s right of subrogation. (SeeR., p. 109 at, 47). The
Commission's ruling misses the mark because it: (1) is inconsistent with the plain language ofl.C.
§ 72-223(3); (2) misconstrues this Court's decisions in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho
715,992 P.2d 164, 170(1999)and Cameron v. Minidoka Highway District, 125 Idaho 801,874 P.2d
1108 (1994); (3) is inconsistent with the policies behind subrogation; and (4) may impede access to
the justice system and enable responsible tortfeasors to escape liability.

1.

The plain language of subsection 72-223(3) supports Mr. Izaguirre's request for
allocation.

The question to be decided by this Court is whether I.C. § 72-223(3) gives a worker's
compensation surety the right to recover all of the proceeds of a third party settlement. To answer
BRJEF OF THE IDAHO TRJAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION AS AMICUS
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this question, the analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself. This Court has long
held that where a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, it speaks for itself and must be given the
interpretation the language clearly implies. Moon v. Investment Bd., 97 Idaho 595, 596, 548 P.2d
861, 862 (1976).
Subsection 72-223(3) ofthe Idaho Code is the provision which grants an employer (or its
surety) who has paid worker's compensation benefits the right to "subrogation." It states:
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having paid such
compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated to the rights of
the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's
compensation liability.
I.C. § 72-223(3) (emphasis added). "Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of
another with reference to a legal right." Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 3, 740 P.2d 43,45 (1987).
"Black's Law Dictionary defines subrogation as 'The right of one who has paid an obligation which
another should have paid to be indemnified by the other."' Id.
The surety's right to subrogation is not unfettered under I.C. § 72-223(3). The language
emphasized above is an important limitation on the right of subrogation. The surety only has a right
of subrogation to the extent ofthe worker's compensation liability (i.e., benefits it has paid or will
pay in the future). In other words, the surety can only recover the monies paid for losses covered

by worker's compensation. There is nothing in the plain language that grants the surety the right to
recover its interests from monies awarded to the claimant for losses not covered by worker's
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compensation (e.g., lost wages not covered by worker's compensation, pain and suffering). Damages
for uncovered losses belong to the employee.
The importance of the language emphasized above can be seen when comparing section 72223(3) as it exists now with the right of subrogation that a worker's compensation surety had in the
past. This Court addressed the extent of a surety's right of subrogation in Hall v. Young's Dairy
Products Co., 98 Idaho 562, 569 P .2d 907 (1977). In Hall, the surety's right of subrogation was
governed by I. C.§ 72-204 which existed at that time. Section 72-204 stated:
When an injury for which compensation is payable under this act shall have been
sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a
legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may, at his
option, either claim compensation under this act or obtain damages from or proceed
at law against such other person to recover damages; and if compensation is claimed
and awarded under this act any employer having paid the compensation or having
become liable therefor shall be subrogated to the rights ofthe injured employee to
recover against that person; provided if the employer shall recover from such other
person damages in excess of the compensation already paid or awarded to be paid
under this act, then any such excess shall be paid to the injured employee less the
employer's expenses and costs of action.
See Hall, 98 Idaho at 563-64, 569 P.2d 908-09 (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 72-204). Section
72-204 granted the surety an unlimited right to subrogation. The surety had the right to pursue the
third party tortfeasor and recover all of the damages sustained by the surety and the employee. The
employee was entitled to compensation only if there was an excess award. It was clear from the
statute that the employer got the first and last dollar of any recovery if it was necessary to satisfY the
subrogated interest.
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Today's statutory scheme is much different. Today, the surety does not have an unlimited
subrogated interest. It can only step into the shoes of the employee to recover what it has paid or will
pay in the future. Damages for uncovered losses belong to the employee.
It is evident that the Idaho legislature understands how to create a statutory scheme that

grants an unfettered right of subrogation. Another example of an unfettered subrogation right is
found in the Medicaid statutes. For years, the Department of Health and Welfare was entitled to the
first dollar and last dollar of a third party recovery if necessary to recover its subrogated interest
under the Medicaid program. See I. C. § 56-209b(3)-(6). The language used to create the subrogation
interest under the worker's compensation system today and the Medicaid system are substantially
similar:
Worker's Compensation

Medicaid

Ifcompensation has been claimed and awarded,
the employer having paid such compensation or
having become liable therefor, shall be
subrogated to the rights of the em12loyee. to
recover l!gainst such third party to the extent of
the em12loyer' s com12ensation liabili:ty.

In all cases where the department of health and
welfare through the medical assistance program
has or will be required to pay medical expenses
for a recipient and that recipient is entitled to
recover any or all such medical expenses from
any third party or entity, the department of
health and welfare will be subrogated to the
rights of the reci12ient to the extent of the
amount of medical assistance benefits 12aid by
the department as the result of the occurrence
giving rise to the claim against the third party
or entity.

I.C. § 72-223(3) (emphasis added).

I.C. § 56-290b(3) (emphasis added).
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The Medicaid subrogation statute does not end, however, with subsection (3 ). The legislature
enacted additional provisions making it clear and unambiguous that the Department of Health and
Welfare is entitled to recover the first and last dollar of any third party settlement. Section 56209b(4) provided:

In addition if the recipient recovers funds, either by settlement or judgment, from
such a third party or entity, the recipient shall reimburse the department to the extent
of the funds received in settlement minus attorney's fees and costs, the amount of
the medical assistance benefits paid by the department on his behalf as a result of the
occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance.

I.C. § 56-209b(4) (emphasis added).

***

Section 56-209(b)(5) also provided:

The department shall have priority to any amount received from a third party or
entity which can reasonably be construed to compensate the recipient for the
occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance, whether the settlement or
judgment is obtained through the subrogation right of the department or through
recovery by the recipient, and whether or not the recipient is made whole by the
amount recovered. The department will be entitled to reimbursement of medical
assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient arising from the incident or
occurrence prior to any amount being distributed to the recipient.

I.C. § 56-209b(5) (emphasis added).

***

The Medicaid subrogation statute even has a provision making it clear that if a settlement or
judgment is received without an allocation, then it is presumed that the settlement or judgment
applies first to the medical expenses paid by the Department of Health and Welfare. Section 56-
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209b(6) states in relevant part:

***
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without delineating what
portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of medical expenses, it will be
presumed that the settlement or judgment applies first to the medical expenses
incurred by the recipient in an amount equal to the expenditure for medical assistance
benefits paid by the department as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the
payment or payments to the recipient.
I.C. § 56-209b(6).
The Foundation recognizes that the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in
Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006) invalidated the
Department's practice of recovering its subrogated interests from moneys allocated to a Medicaid
recipient for losses other than medical expenses (e.g., property damage, lost wages, pain and
suffering). See Dept of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P.3d 905 (2008).
Provisions enabling a Medicaid program to attach damages belonging to a plaintiff violate
Medicaid's prohibition against placing a lien on a participant's personal property. See id. at 444-45,
196 P.3d at 910-11 (discussing federal anti-lien provisions). While subsections 56-209b(4) and 56209b(5) are now essentially invalid, the point being made here remains the same -the Idaho
legislature understands how to draft a statute which clearly and unambiguously grants a subrogation
right which extends to the first and last dollar of a third party recovery. The legislature has not done
that in I.C. § 72-223 or any other provision of the worker's compensation laws. The worker's
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compensation laws do not contain a functional equivalent of subsections 56-209b(4)- (6). Because
the surety's subrogation right is limited to damages for losses covered by worker's compensation,
this case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission with instructions to allocate the
settlement proceeds among covered and non-covered losses which are supported by the evidence
(e.g., past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past lost wages, future lost wages, pain and
suffering) and to recalculate the credit to which the surety is entitled under subsection 72-223(5).

2.

The Industrial Commission's analysis ofStruhs and Cameron misses the mark.

The Industrial Commission found that this Court's decision in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies,
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164, 170 (1999) is controlling precedent and required the Commission
to rule that the surety's subrogated interest extends to all of the settlement proceeds received by Mr.
Izaguirre. (R., pp. 106-109). In Struhs, the claimant was injured in a car accident. His worker's
compensation surety paid approximately $22,000 in benefits. The claimant settled his claim with
the third party for $45,000 and signed a settlement agreement which stated that the benefits were
payment for "general damages"- a category of damages which does not correspond to any of the
benefits payable under Idaho's worker's compensation laws. Neither the employee nor his attorney
told the surety about the settlement, and the surety only learned of it after contacting the attorney to
find out what had happened to the claim. The employee filed a worker's compensation claim against
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the surety, and the surety essentially made a counter-claim against the employee and his attorney to
recover its subrogated interest.
In construing Struhs in this case, the Industrial Commission held:
In the context of the question of whether or not a portion of the proceeds of a third
party settlement are not subject to the I. C. § 72-223 right of subrogation, Struhs is
just as important for what is does not say, as what it says. Having specifically
found that the claimant in Struhs could not affect the surety's right of subrogation by
incorporating certain language into the third party settlement to which surety was not
a party, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement must be ignored, and
that surety's right of subrogation was deemed to extend to the entire third party
recovery. Had the Court been ofthe view that LC. § 72-223limited surety's right
of subrogation to that portion of the proceeds of a third party recovery which
corresponded to worker's compensation benefits paid, it would, presumably, have
found it necessary to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings
along the lines of the inquiries which are before the Commission in the instant
matter. That the Court did not do this in Struhs, is telling, and consistent with the
plain language ofi.C. § 72-223(3) ....
(R., p. 107-08,, 43).
The Industrial Commission's reading of Struhs goes too far. This Court did not conclude
anywhere in the Struhs decision that the "surety's right of subrogation was deemed to extend to the
entire third party recovery." The Struhs court addressed a very narrow subrogation issue which it
characterized as: " It is a matter of first impression before this Court whether an agreement between
a third-party tortfeasor and an injured employee can restrict the employer's subrogation rights."
Struhs, 133 Idaho at 170-71, 992 P.2d at 170. The Industrial Commission "presumed" that the
Struhs case addressed the extent of the surety's subrogated interest, but this presumption cannot
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logically be made since the settlement at issue was for $45,000 and the amount the surety was
seeking was approximately $22,000. The surety was not seeking the entire settlement and did not
appear to be seeking any type of credit for future benefits. In addition, there is no information
contained in the opinion as to whether Struhs argued for an allocation like Mr. Izaguirre has done
in this case. The Industrial Commission's "presumption" misses the mark.
Similarly, the Industrial Commission's reliance on Cameron v. Minidoka Highway District,
125 Idaho 801, 874 P.3d 1108 (1994) is misplaced. In Cameron, the claimants and the surety
actually stipulated and agreed that the third party settlement received by the Camerons extinguished
the surety's obligation to pay future benefits. The only issue that was addressed in Cameron was the
surety's liability for attorney's fees on the benefits that it saved as a result of the third party
settlement. The Cameron decision had nothing to do with the extent of the surety's subrogated
interest in the settlement funds. Furthermore, the Cameron decision no longer appears to have any
substantive precedential value since the legislature enacted LC. § 72-223(5) in 1999 in an apparent
response to the decision. Subsection 72-223(5) makes it clear that a surety does not have to pay any
costs or fees at the time a credit for future benefits is claimed. Rather, the credit is applied and costs
and fees are owed when the future benefit becomes payable unless there is another agreement
between the parties. See House Bill No. 1035 with Statement of Purpose attached hereto as
Appendix 1. Because the Industrial Commission's interpretations of Struhs and Cameron do not
support its decision, this case should be remanded with instructions to allocate the settlement
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION AS AMICUS
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proceeds among covered and non-covered losses and to recalculate the credit to which the surety is
entitled under subsection 72-223(5).

3.

Mr. Izaguirre's position is consistent with the purpose of subrogation.

The Industrial Commission held that if it adopted Mr. Izaguirre's position it would frustrate
the purpose ofl.C. § 72-223(3). (R., p. 108-09, ~ 45). This Court has explained that "[t]he purpose
of legal subrogation is to work out an equitable adjustment between parties by assuring that the
discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it.

An additional purpose of subrogation for third party liability is to prevent the injured claimant from
obtaining a double recovery for an injury." See Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 3, 740 P.2d 43, 45
( 1987) (citations omitted). The Industrial Commission's conclusion is inconsistent with this Court's
stated purpose of subrogation.
Unlike the situation in Struhs, Mr. Izaguirre is not seeking to thwart the surety's subrogated
interest. Mr. Izaguirre has already reimbursed the surety more than $32,000 and actually paid
approximately $4,000 more than what he was legally required to pay (R., p. 115,

~

62).

Mr.

Izaguirre requested that the Commission allocate his settlement proceeds among the various
categories of damages, including general damages for pain and suffering. His position is that any
money allocated for pain and suffering should be not be used as a credit against future benefits owed
by the surety because the pain and suffering damages belong to him. Instead, the surety's subrogated
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interest should be limited to amounts allocated for items such as future medical expenses and future
lost wages. Mr. Izaguirre's position is consistent with the purpose of the subrogation statute. It will
not result in a "double recovery" because he is only keeping those damages that belong to him.
Moreover, the responsible party has been held accountable for the injuries Mr. Izaguirre sustained.
The Industrial Commission also concluded that its ruling would encourage resolution of
subrogated interests at the "front end" of a case (i.e., at the time of the resolution of the third party
claim), as it should be. (R., p. 109, ~ 46). The Industrial Commission stated:
In so ruling, we recognize that claimant and surety may, of course, make their own
agreement concerning the allocation of the proceeds of a third party settlement.
Disputes of the type currently before the Commission could be avoided by
encouraging claimants and subrogated sureties to address whether and/or how the
proceeds of a third party recovery are to be allocated, contemporaneous with the
settlement of the third party claim. If claimant and the subrogated carrier cannot
come to agreement, then perhaps the third party settlement will be impeded.
However, that is preferable to avoiding the issue, settling the third party case, and
trusting the Industrial Commission to ascertain how the proceeds of a third party
settlement of a personal injury claim should be allocated to special and general
damages, and whether the settlement corresponds to workers' compensation benefits
paid."

(R., p. 109, ~ 46).
The overwhelming question that this statement brings to mind is: "Why would any worker's
compensation surety be willing to agree to an allocation of damages if the entirety of the settlement
fund is subject to the surety's subrogated interest?" There is no incentive whatsoever for the surety
to concede to any type of allocation. The surety is much better off simply accepting repayment of
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the past amounts paid and then sitting back and waiting to see if any future benefits may be owed.
If future benefits are owed, the surety can then claim that the entire settlement is subject to the credit
and obtain the maximum financial benefit.
The Industrial Commission's ruling does not promote the efficient settlement of claims.
To the contrary, it impedes them. If the surety is entitled to the first and last dollar of a settlement,
it has little incentive to compromise. Similarly, a claimant who is likely to receive little or nothing
from a settlement is actually encouraged to "roll the dice" with a jury even when the facts of a case
do not justify doing so.

While the Foundation strongly supports our system of trial by jury, the

reality is that litigants, lawyers and judges alike all have a strong interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980). The Industrial Commission's ruling does not further that goal.
Although the Industrial Commission contends that it is "ill-equipped" and "disinclined" to
undertake the allocation of settlement proceeds, it is important to recognize that the Commission
performed this function admirably when it allocated that portion of the settlement proceeds which
belongs to Mrs. Izaguirre on account of her loss of consortium claim. The Industrial Commission
has far more experience than any jury when it comes to evaluating the impact of injuries and the
types of damages that can and should be awarded. Because the position advocated by Mr. Izaguirre
is consistent with the purpose ofl.C. § 72-223(3) and the Industrial Commission is well-suited for
allocating damages, the Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's decision and remand this
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION AS AMICUS
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case with instructions to allocate the settlement proceeds and recalculate the credit to which the
surety is entitled under subsection 72-223(5).

4.

The Industrial Commission's ruling may impede access to the legal system and
result in responsible tortfeasors escaping liability.

If this Court were to affirm the Industrial Commission's decision, it may have a chilling
effect on tort claims. If the rule is that a worker's compensation surety has aright to the first and last
dollar of a recovery, it means that an attorney must evaluate whether he can actually put any money
in a client's pocket before he takes the case. If the claimant has significant medical expenses that
have been paid by the surety and there is a substantial likelihood of either no recovery or a small
recovery from the third party (e.g., small liability policy, third part insolvency), a responsible,
competent attorney will likely find himself in the position of turning the client down because the
potential recovery does not justify the time, effort or expense of litigation. In this type of situation,
the only winner is the third party who caused the injury. It means injured parties may not find
competent counsel to represent them, claims may not be brought and tortfeasors may not be held
responsible. Public policy justifies the type of allocation that Mr. Izaguirre is proposing. His
approach is reasonable and consistent with the dual purposes of subrogation. Because the Industrial
Commission is well-situated to allocate the proceeds of a personal injury settlement in a case where
an agreement cannot be reached and because allocation furthers the purposes of subrogation, this
case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission with instructions to allocate the proceeds of
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Mr. Izaguirre's settlement and recalculate the credit to which the surety is entitled under subsection
72-223(5).

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation as Amicus Curiae
urges this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's ruling and remand this case with instructions
to apportion Mr. Izaguirre's settlement proceeds and recalculate the credit the surety is to receive
against future compensation benefits.

;{

DATED this ./.L:_ day of June, 2012.

. Brody
ounsel for Amicus Curiae
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation
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Bill Text
81035

IIII
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IIII
Fifty-fifth Legislature
First Regular Session - 1999

IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1035
BY COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

AN ACT
RELATING TO WORKER'S COMPENSATION; AMENDING SECTION 72-223,
IDAHO CODE,
TO
PROVIDE THAT AN EMPLOYER SHALL RECEIVE A CREDIT AGAINST ITS FUTURE LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS IF THE AMOUNT RECOVERED FROM A THIRD PARTY
EXCEEDS THE AMOUNT OF THE SUBROGATED PORTION PAYABLE TO THE EMPLOYER FOR
PAST COMPENSATION BENEFITS PAID AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE EMPLOYER'S REIMBURSEMENT TO THE EMPLOYEE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS PAID BY THE
EMPLOYEE IN OBTAINING THAT PORTION OF THE THIRD PARTY RECOVERY CORRESPONDING TO THE CREDIT CLAIMED.

10

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

11
12

SECTION 1. That Section
amended to read as follows:

13
14
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

72-223. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY. (1) The right to compensation under this
law shall not be affected by the fact that the injury, occupational disease or
death is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than the
employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor,
such person so liable
being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall not include those
employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or other
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for
any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.
(2)
Action may be instituted against such third party by the employee, or
in event compensation has been claimed and awarded, by the employee and
employer jointly, in the employee's name, or, if the employee refuses to participate in such action, by the employer in the employee's name.
(3)
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having
paid such compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated
to the rights of the employee, to recover against such third party to the
extent of the employer's compensation liability.
(4)
On any recovery by the employee against a third party,
the employer
shall pay or have deducted from his subrogated portion thereof, a proportionate share of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in obtaining such recovery.

72-223, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
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(5)
If the amount recovered from the third party exceeds the amount
of the subrogated portion payable to the employer for past compensation benefits paid, then to the extent the employer has a future subrogated interest in
that portion of the third party recovery paid to the employee, the employer
shall receive a credit against its future liability for compensation benefits.
Such credit shall apply as future compensation benefits become payable, and
the employer shall reimburse the employee for the proportionate share of
attorney's fees and costs paid by the employee in obtaining that portion of

2
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

the third party recovery corresponding to the credit claimed. The employer
shall not be required to pay such attorney's fees and costs related to the
future credit prior to the time the credit is claimed. However, the employer
and employee may agree to different terms if approved by the industrial commission.
(6)
If death results from the injury or occupational disease and
if the employee leaves no dependents entitled to benefits under this law,
the
surety shall have a right of action against the third party for recovery of
income benefits, reasonable expenses of medical and related services and
burial expense actually paid by the surety and for recovery of amounts paid
into the industrial special indemnity account pursuant to section 72-420,
Idaho Code,
and such right of action shall be in addition to any cause of
action of the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased.
(-u-_2_)
All rights and restrictions herein granted
to the employer have previously been intended to be, and are hereby expressly
granted to the industrial special indemnity account.

Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Impact
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 08581C1
There are some workers, compensation cases that involve a
third party whose actions were the cause of an accident and
injury to a worker. If the injured worker is successful in
recovering damages from the third party, the surety/employer
also has a right to recover any workers' compensation
liability they incur as a result of the accident. At the time
the surety/employer receives their recovery for monies already
paid out in benefits, they are obligated to pay a portion of
the injured worker's attorneys fees which made the recovery
possible. The portion of fees the surety/employer must pay is
based on the amount of their recovery.
Because there are often future expenses associated with the
injury, the surety/employer will have to pay their share of
attorney's fees based on the amount of any future recovery.
Today, they are required to pay these fees in advance, based
on an estimate of future recovery. This bill will require the
surety/employer to pay at the time they receive the recovery.
FISCAL IMPACT
There will be no fiscal impact to the General Fund.
CONTACT

http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/1999/S 1035.html

6/3/2012

Page 4 of4

SENATE BILL NO. 1035- Workers comp/3rd party liablty/cred

Name: Dawn Justice, VP Human Resources
Organization: Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry
Phone: 343-1849
Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Impact
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